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The Self Is Not Gendered: 
Sulabha’s Debate with King Janaka
RUTH VANITA
This essay highlights the debate on women and gender in ancient Indian 
texts. Neither the popular nor the scholarly debate in modern India has 
paid suffi cient attention to unmarried learned women in ancient Hindu 
texts. I examine the recurrent fi gure of Sulabha, a single woman and 
an intellectual-renunciant; I focus on her debate with philosopher-king 
Janaka in the epic Mahabharata. When Janaka uses anti-women argu-
ments to critique Sulabha’s unconventional behavior, Sulabha success-
fully establishes, on the basis of Hindu philosophical principles, that 
there is no essential difference between a man and a woman; she also 
demonstrates by her own example that a woman may achieve libera-
tion by the same means as a man. In the same epic, a married woman 
wins her debate with a male sage, proving that even a woman following 
the conventional path of wifely devotion may equal or outdo a sage in 
wisdom and virtue.
Keywords: antiquity / gender / Hinduism / India / Mahabharata / Manu-
smriti / women
Who is Sulabha? Not many people, not even many Sanskrit scholars, 
recognize the name at once. She is a single woman, a learned renun-
ciant, who, in the ancient epic, the Mahabharata, wins a debate with 
philosopher-king Janaka in the presence of eminent Brahman scholars. 
In this debate, Sulabha logically establishes that there is no essential dif-
ference between a man and a woman; she also demonstrates by her own 
example that a woman may achieve liberation by the same means as a 
man. Modern scholars of the Mahabharata have not paid much attention 
to this episode nor have feminist studies of ancient India given it the 
importance it deserves.1
Modern Debates and Ancient Debates on Women
In modern India, there is both a scholarly and a popular debate on women 
in ancient India. The popular wing of this debate suffers from an over 
emphasis on the law book, Manavadharmashastra or Manusmriti (circa 
fi rst century CE).2 This emphasis is largely the legacy of British colonial 
administrators who, although they themselves were familiar with British 
common law, similar in some ways to the plethora of regional and com-
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munity customary laws prevailing amongst Hindus, decided to simplify 
their administrative tasks in India by compiling a digest of Hindu law 
based on translations of ancient treatises. To this end, the Bengal govern-
ment published Sir William Jones’s translation of Manusmriti in 1794.
The British justifi ed their rule partly by attacking Indian social and 
political structures as iniquitous. This attack was primarily focused 
on Brahmans, hence the Manusmriti, which the Jones school of Brit-
ish administrators had magnifi ed as symbolic of India’s greatness, was 
declared a Brahmanical code and critiqued by the Macaulay school of 
administrators as symbolic of Indian society’s backwardness.
Indian nationalists also took sides in this popular debate that still 
continues today. By selective quotation of some of Manu’s dicta, such as 
his famous statement that the gods reside where women are honored, one 
group argues that the Manusmriti exalts women. By equally selective 
quotation of others of his dicta, such as his famous pronouncement that 
a woman should never be independent but should be under the protection 
of her father in youth, husband in adulthood, and son in old age, the other 
group argues that the Manusmriti is the source of gender oppression in 
India. Both groups agree in projecting Manu as the source of Hindu law. 
Thus, when admirers of Manu installed a statue of him in the precincts of 
the high court in Rajasthan, western India, his detractors protested, and 
burnt copies of the Manusmriti on 25 March 2000 (Kishwar 2000, 3).
Scholars agree that women’s status declined from the Vedic period (c. 
1500 BCE) to the period beginning about the fi rst century CE. They differ, 
however, as to the extent of the decline. Some scholars, while agreeing 
that women in the epics and Puranas (the Puranas are sacred texts dedi-
cated to various deities, composed between the second century BCE and 
the thirteenth century CE) are generally subordinated to men, nevertheless 
claim that women are usually honored, have equal status to men in some 
spheres, and even more power than men in a few spheres.3
On the other hand, many Marxist and feminist critics argue that in this 
period woman “totally lost her human dignity” and “has been a chattel 
in India ever since the later Vedic times” (Bhattacharji 1994, 12, 89), and 
internalized her subordination to the extent that she did not protest or 
question it (Shah 1995, 72). These scholars view the dramatic rise of god-
dess worship and goddess theology from the Puranic period onwards as 
irrelevant to or even detrimental to women’s status insofar as goddesses 
“do not suffer” and human women therefore cannot “feel empathy” with 
them (Bhattacharji 1994, 36). Some feminist scholars disagree with this 
view, and argue that to the extent that goddesses are seen as residing 
in women and girls, especially in Tantra and Shakta traditions, they do 
empower human women (Kinsley 1986; Gupta 2000).
In my view, modern debates do not suffi ciently recognize the fact 
that there was an ongoing debate about women in ancient Hindu texts. 
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The often seemingly self-contradictory pronouncements about women 
found in accretive ancient texts may refl ect that debate, as do the varying 
interpretations of oral as well as written law. Both in pre-modern and in 
modern India, laws, especially written laws, are accessible to very few 
people and followed by even fewer, while most people are more likely to 
follow practices that are customary within their local castes and com-
munities. However, these customary laws that vary widely from region 
to region and even village to village, are themselves always in dispute and 
open to varying interpretations, just as are written law codes. Hindu writ-
ten law codes, from the Manusmriti through the British law codes to laws 
passed in independent India, always recognize the legal force and validity 
of custom. It is the bewildering plethora of interpretations of customary 
law that constitute the ongoing debate in the legal arena.
The varying versions and interpretations of the epic and Puranic stories 
that emerged at different times and places across the country and were 
accessible to most people through regular oral retellings and dramatic 
enactments also represent that debate. The Sulabha-Janaka debate in the 
canonical Sanskrit Mahabharata is an important example of that ongoing 
discussion. Janaka argues in favor of women’s subordination, projecting 
a view found both in the Manusmriti and in many other texts, including 
the epics.4 Sulabha contests this view, basing her arguments on standard 
philosophical propositions.
Finally, I compare and contrast the Sulabha-Janaka debate with another 
similar debate in the Mahabharata—that between a married woman and 
the great sage Kaushika. Once again, the woman wins the debate and 
proves that while following the conventional path of wifely devotion, she 
is in fact more virtuous than he is. While many women could hope to 
imitate this model, fewer could aspire to be like Sulabha.
The Single Woman as Intellectual
I am interested in the fi gure of the single woman as intellectual-renun-
ciant. This fi gure defi es the dictum that a woman should always be under 
the protection of a man. How do the texts in which a fi gure like Sulabha 
appears justify her existence independent of men? How do they value her 
contribution to knowledge?
Behind the fi gure of the autonomous learned woman stands the fi gure 
of the autonomous goddess who presides over learning. Paradoxically, 
while the goddess of speech and of learning and the arts, Saraswati, gen-
erally represented without a consort, is very prominent in Indian popu-
lar culture, feminist scholars, both in the West and in India, have paid 
scarcely any attention to her. They have focused most of their attention 
on warrior mother goddesses such as Durga, Kali, and Chhinamasta.5 
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Concomitantly, feminist study of women’s agency and resistance in the 
epics has focused not on single women but on the angry protests of wives, 
such as Draupadi’s protest against her husband Yudhishthira’s gambling 
her away, or Sita’s protest against her husband Rama’s unjust and harsh 
treatment of her after he rescues her from her abductor, Ravana. Less 
attention has been paid to women’s participation in intellectual and 
philosophical conversation, even though both Sita and Draupadi engage 
in such conversations. Conversely, within mainstream Hindu tradition, 
Saraswati, who is widely worshiped in educational institutions and by 
those engaged in the arts, has been a symbol for education in general, and 
women’s education in particular.
It is noteworthy that in the earliest Hindu sacred text, the Rigveda 
Samhita (c. 1500 BCE), the goddess Vak has no consort, and Saraswati too 
is worshiped without a consort in most traditions. On the other hand, the 
warrior goddesses are mostly incarnations of Parvati, consort of Shiva. 
Radha, who has received a lot of attention from scholars of Vaishnavism, 
is usually worshiped along with Krishna (Hawley and Wulff 1982). Femi-
nist scholars’ neglect of Saraswati is related to their focus on wives and 
mothers to the neglect of single women in ancient Indian texts.
Sulabha is a female ascetic or Rishika who is not a Brahman but a 
Kshatriya. Like the philosopher-king, Janaka, she belongs to the ruler-
warrior community, not the priestly and scholarly community. Whereas 
Janaka is a husband and a king even while he pursues philosophical truth, 
Sulabha, by becoming an ascetic, opts out of social institutions like mar-
riage, caste, and community.
It is important that neither Sulabha nor Janaka is just a character 
in a particular story, as is, for example, the Pandava hero Bhima. Both 
Sulabha and Janaka are symbolic fi gures who appear in different texts, in 
the Vedic as well as in the epic and Puranic periods. She represents the 
female scholar par excellence and he the scholar who is also a king. Thus 
the Saulabha Shakha (now lost) of the Rigveda Samhita is attributed to 
Sulabha. She appears again in the Kaushitaki Brahmana, in the list of 
revered teachers to whom salutations must be offered. Her most important 
appearance as a character is in the Shanti Parva of the epic Mahabharata, 
where she enters into a debate with King Janaka.
The Mahabharata, an accretive text whose date is disputed, was proba-
bly composed and compiled over a period of 800 years, between the fourth 
century BCE and the fourth century CE. Often termed the fi fth Veda, it is 
the longest epic in the world, and tells the story of a battle between two 
sets of cousins. This story is submerged in a plethora of other stories, 
debates, and discussions. Even though few Hindus have read the entire 
epic, the stories of the Mahabharata are widely disseminated through 
song, drama, and now cinema and television. Figures and events from 
these stories have become both idiomatic and fi gurative in Indian lan-
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guages. The Mahabharata contains the BhagvadGita, the dialog between 
Krishna and Arjuna that is among the most widely read Hindu sacred 
texts.
Debate and Dialog in Hindu Texts
Debate is the single most important organizing principle in ancient Hindu 
texts. It may take the form of structured question and answer, friendly 
discussion and dialog, or formal shastrartha (debate) between rival schools 
of thought. In the Mahabharata it occurs most often as conversation. 
In fact, the whole epic is structured as a series of conversations encased 
one within the other. These conversations take place between ancestors 
and descendants, male friends (Krishna and Arjuna), male and female 
friends (Krishna and Draupadi), female friends (Draupadi and Satyabhama), 
enemies, siblings, parents and children, husbands and wives, gods and 
humans, human and non-human animals, servants and masters, teachers 
and pupils, and strangers who encounter one another by chance.
A wide spectrum of issues, ranging from vegetarianism to justice to 
gender to the means of attaining liberation from rebirth, are discussed 
at length, and powerful arguments are advanced on several sides of each 
question. While many different answers are presented, one of them usu-
ally, but not always, emerges as the correct answer. This does not mean, 
however, that the other answers are completely invalidated.
Perhaps the most famous debate between a woman and a man in an 
ancient Hindu text is that between Gargi and Yajnavalkya, which takes 
place in the presence of King Janaka, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. 
Feminist scholars usually cite this debate as an example of the silencing 
of women in patriarchal society because the debate ends with Yajnavalkya 
silencing Gargi by telling her that if she asks any more questions her head 
will fall off.
Conversely, both the debates here examined—between King Janaka 
and the female ascetic Sulabha, and between the married woman and 
the sage Kaushika—end with the silencing of the male participant. The 
Sulabha-Janaka debate takes place in the Shanti Parva section of the epic 
Mahabharata. The Shanti Parva was composed later than many other 
sections of the epic, but is philosophically well integrated with the rest 
of the epic.
The Sulabha-Janaka debate may refl ect a debate between different 
schools of Hindu philosophy. While it is framed as a debate regarding 
the relative superiority of action and renunciation as paths to liberation 
(moksha) from the cycle of rebirth, this is also a debate about gender, spe-
cifi cally whether a woman can be autonomous, can be a man’s intellectual 
equal or superior, and can attain emancipation independently.
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Although the text may be infl uenced by Buddhism and/or may be 
responding to Buddhism, Sulabha is not represented as a Buddhist. While 
Buddhism introduced organized female asceticism (despite the initial 
reluctance of Buddha to allow women into the monastic order), Hindu 
female ascetics do appear in many ancient texts. Sulabha is of particular 
interest because her asceticism is not undertaken in the capacity of a 
hermit’s wife, as is that of other female hermits in the Mahabharata. She 
is a single woman who is an ascetic in her own right. Nor is she part of any 
organized order or monastery, as Buddhist nuns were. We are explicitly 
told that she wanders over the earth. As such, she represents one type or 
ideal of Hindu asceticism, here embodied in a female. This is important, 
because many modern commentators who see Buddhism as more libera-
tory for women than Hinduism tend to think that renunciation was avail-
able to Buddhist but not to Hindu women.
Hindu texts in general tend to represent women as embodiments 
of action, and to reserve renunciation for men. In the Vedic texts, the 
primal principle of action or nature, Prakriti, is gendered female, while 
Purusha, or the consciousness that witnesses action while remaining 
detached from it, is gendered male. This gendering of primal principles 
is of course not coterminous with human males and females, since each 
human individual partakes of both Purusha and Prakriti. Nevertheless, 
that gendering does infl uence Hindu ideas of gender roles, with the man 
being perceived as more inclined to spiritual knowledge and the woman 
as more inclined to earthly action. Both scholarly and popular wisdom 
subscribe to the idea that the primary path to emancipation for a Hindu 
woman is devotion to her husband. Several normative characters in the 
Mahabharata actually state this to be the case.
The fi gure of Sulabha, however, shows that the Mahabharata, like 
Hindu thought in general, is by no means unifi ed on this issue. The 
equation of women with action is not a necessary one. It is possible and 
desirable for a Hindu woman to attain emancipation by renunciation. 
The Atman (Self/Spirit) is gendered neuter in Sanskrit, and is the same 
in all beings. This premise is basic to Sulabha’s sophisticated argument 
regarding the irrelevance of gender to emancipation or to the particular 
path taken by an individual.
Context of the Debate
The Shanti Parva is, as its name indicates, about peace in its widest 
sense. More specifi cally, this long section of the Mahabharata occurs 
as a conversation between the eldest of the fi ve Pandava brothers, King 
Yudhishthira, and his great-uncle Bhishma. The conversation occurs after 
the battle has been won by the Pandavas.
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Bhishma is the son of the river goddess Ganga. His name literally 
means “the terrible” because of the awe-inspiring vow of lifelong celi-
bacy he took as a young man to please his father, and he is the epitome 
of the virtuous and wise person. He participates in the battle in a selfl ess 
manner because his vow of celibacy was accompanied by renunciation of 
the kingship in favor of his younger brother. Though childless, he func-
tions in the text as a father fi gure to all his nephews. Fatally wounded 
during the battle, he does not die because he has the power to die only 
when he chooses. He lies on a bed of arrows that he considers the only fi t 
bed for a warrior.
After the battle, the Pandavas, King Yudhishthira, and their allies go 
to visit Bhishma. Yudhishthira, who throughout the text represents the 
virtuous wisdom-seeker, questions Bhishma about how to rule as a king 
and how to achieve liberation from the cycle of rebirth. His questions and 
Bhishma’s answers compose the Shanti Parva. The title suggests that the 
answers, if acted upon, establish peace after war, in the individual and in 
society. After Bhishma has spoken about the various aspects of kingship 
and rule, Yudhishthira asks Bhishma how to attain liberation from the 
cycle of death and rebirth. This section within the Shanti Parva is known 
as Mokshadharma Parva.
At one point in this section, Yudhishthira asks how one can avoid old 
age and death. Bhishma tells him that King Janaka had once asked his 
guru, the Rishi (ascetic) named Panchashikha, this question and was told 
that old age and death cannot be avoided. All human relationships are 
transient like life itself. The only way to escape death is to escape birth 
as well, that is, to be freed from the cycle of rebirth. Yudhishthira, him-
self a husband, father, and king, then asks whether it is possible to attain 
emancipation from the cycle of rebirth without abandoning the domestic 
way of life.
In response, Bhishma recounts the story of Janaka and Sulabha. King 
Janaka, in ancient Hindu texts, is the epitome of the philosopher king, a 
perfectly wise ruler who is also a sage. Bhishma says that a female men-
dicant and yogini, Sulabha, while wandering over the earth, hears from 
many ascetics that Janaka is devoted to the religion of emancipation so 
she decides to meet him. Using her Yoga powers, she assumes the form 
of a faultlessly beautiful young woman and presents herself to Janaka as 
a mendicant.
It is signifi cant that she assumes both forms (of a woman and a mendi-
cant), that is, neither form is integral to or inseparable from her self. This 
connects to the philosophical point she makes later, that all forms are 
transitory and apparent, not permanent or innate to the Atman. The king 
is fi lled with wonder at her delicate form. He welcomes her as an honored 
guest, seats her on an excellent seat, and offers her water to wash her feet 
and good food to refresh herself. Bhishma continues:
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Doubting whether Janaka had succeeded in attaining to Emancipation, . . . 
Sulabha, endued [endowed] with Yoga-power, entered the understanding of 
the king by her own understanding. Restraining, by means of the rays of light 
that emanated from her own eyes, the rays issuing from the eyes of the king, 
the lady, desirous of ascertaining the truth, bound up King Janaka with Yoga 
bonds. (Ganguly 1973, X:57)
The word “sanchodayishyanti,” used for her action, indicates that 
she questions or examines him not in words but internally by her Yoga 
powers. Janaka reacts with hostility to this examination. As a sage and a 
king, Janaka has reached the pinnacle of two types of male achievement. 
Sulabha’s internal questioning of him suggests that her Yoga powers equal 
or surpass his own. Janaka is unused to being challenged or tested in this 
way, but what particularly irks him is that a woman dares to test him as 
an equal.
Janaka’s Conventional View of Women
Interrupting Sulabha’s questioning, Janaka addresses her at length. After 
stating that he respects Sulabha and desires to know her thoroughly, 
Janaka demands to know who she is, whose she is, where she has come 
from, and where she is going. He declares that he is free from the vanity 
of kingship, and he is the only person who can discourse to her on eman-
cipation. He emphasizes his high spiritual lineage by pointing out that 
he acquired his knowledge from his guru, Panchashikha of Parasara’s 
race. Janaka claims that even though he is a king and is married, he has 
attained knowledge of the Atman (knowledge of oneness of one’s Atman 
with the universal Atman), and is free from all attachments. Though 
alive, he is emancipated. He is free from love for his wife or hatred of his 
enemies. In terms very close to those of Krishna’s instructions in the 
BhagvadGita, he states that he views a lump of gold and a clod of earth 
as equal, and a person who wounds him as equal to a person who honors 
him.
He then makes the bold claim that he is superior to all ascetics who 
have renounced the world. His argument in this regard is that an ascetic’s 
renunciation of the world may be only apparent, not genuine, while con-
versely, a king’s attachment to and enjoyment of the world may be appar-
ent, not genuine. He then aggressively tries to demonstrate that Sulabha 
is not a genuine renunciant. His argument is not entirely logical for it 
proceeds in the following manner: I am superior to all renunciants; renun-
ciants may be attached to the world while kings may be unattached to 
the world. You, Sulabha (because you are a woman), are actually attached 
to the world, while I, the king, am not attached to the world. The only 
prima facie true proposition here is the second—most people would agree 
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and many texts demonstrate that some ascetics may be fake while some 
householders may be emancipated. However, Janaka then proceeds to 
demonstrate his third proposition by appealing to conventional notions 
of gender roles, while his fi rst proposition remains unproved. His bullying 
tone and his masculinist attitude to Sulabha seem quite inappropriate for 
a person who claims to be detached from the world and therefore from 
social prejudices.
He begins his argument regarding Sulabha by telling her that her behav-
ior does not correspond to the ascetic way of life. She is delicate, shapely, 
and youthful, and he therefore doubts that she has subdued her senses. 
The implication here is that a young and beautiful woman is incapable of 
overcoming her desires for sensual and sexual pleasure.
He then goes on to say that her act of entering into him by Yoga powers 
is sinful. He equates this act with sexual union, and in fact, a type of rape, 
as he had not made any gesture inviting her to enter into him. Assum-
ing that this is a physical union between a woman and a man, he points 
out that it is wrong in at least four ways. First, since she is a Brahman 
(he assumes that since she is an ascetic, she must belong to the Brahman 
community) while he is a Kshatriya, a union between them would cause 
an inappropriate mixture of two varnas (literally, colors; fi guratively, the 
four groups into which society is broadly divided). Second, since she is an 
ascetic and he is a householder, a union between them would cause an 
inappropriate mixture of two ways of life. Third, since neither of them 
knows to which gotra (exogamous clans, marriage between members of 
which is forbidden as incestuous) the other belongs, it is possible that the 
union is an unnatural one between members of the same gotra. Fourth, if 
she is married, the union is sinful (interestingly, his being married would 
not make his union with her sinful, as a man may have many sexual rela-
tionships, but a woman only one). Finally, since he does not desire her, 
her union with him is like poison.
He then goes on to speculate that she may have perpetrated all these 
sinful acts because of “ignorance or perverted intelligence” (Ganguly 
1973, X:61), but in any case, by trying to display her superiority to men, 
she has shown herself to be a wicked woman. He wonders whether she is 
the agent of some rival king. This speculation indicates that he is unable 
to conceive of an autonomous female agent and so thinks she must be 
merely an instrument, acting at the behest of a male. Janaka concludes 
this diatribe by stating that the power of kings consists in sovereignty, the 
power of Brahmans in the Vedas, and the power of women in their beauty, 
youth, and marital blessedness, therefore one should never try to deceive a 
king, a Brahman, or a good wife. He then reiterates his questions regarding 
who she is, whose she is, and where she has come from.
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Sulabha’s Philosophical Response
Bhishma comments that Sulabha replies in words more beautiful than 
her person. Sulabha begins her response with a discourse on speech. She 
gives a learned account of the verbal faults and the faults of judgment that 
can occur in speech, and says that her reply will be rational, clear, and not 
prompted by emotions like desire, wrath, fear, or shame. She argues that 
only a speaker who is able to communicate his meaning to the hearer is 
worthy of the title of speaker.
Sulabha then proceeds to address the king’s questions—who she is, 
whose she is, and where she comes from. Her answer is: “As lac and wood, 
as grains of dust and drops of water, exist commingled when brought 
together, even so are the existences of all creatures” (Ganguly 1973, X:
65). This is a statement of the philosophical position that the primal ele-
ments are the same in all bodies and beings, and the same consciousness 
pervades all existents, therefore if Janaka were truly knowledgeable, he 
would not ask her who she is, as he would know that she and he are essen-
tially the same. To regard his own self as different from the self of other 
beings is to lack wisdom.
Sulabha then proceeds to elaborate on the nature of the senses, the 
consciousness, and the principles of existence. Her erudition is evident 
both in this disquisition and in her earlier one on the nature of speech. 
She describes how the fetus is formed from the process of insemination 
and develops in the womb where it acquires a sex. She emphasizes the 
fact that at every stage, “the constituent elements of the body . . . undergo 
change every moment in every creature” (Ganguly 1973, X:66). Particles 
of the body are constantly born and constantly die, but these changes are 
so minute that they cannot be observed, just as one cannot perceive the 
changes in the fl ame of a lamp. Given this state of constant change and 
fl ux in individual identity, “who then has come whence or not whence, 
or whose is it or whose is it not” (X:67)? Identity, being in fl ux, cannot be 
fi xed or possessed.6
This argument demonstrates that sex difference is not an essential dif-
ference. To consider it essential is to be deluded. The king’s emphasis on 
sex difference shows that he is not liberated, as he claims to be. If he were, 
he would see no difference between himself and others: “If it is true thou 
hast, O king, been freed from the knowledge of duality that says—this 
is mine and this other is not mine—then what use is there with such 
questions as, Who art thou, whose art thou and whence does thou come” 
(Ganguly 1973, X:67).
She points out that a king who acts toward others as enemies or allies 
is not emancipated. Here she gestures toward his hostility to her. A king 
who does not look with an equal eye on the weak and the strong is not 
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emancipated. Janaka views her, a woman, as not equal to men. This shows 
his lack of emancipation.
Sulabha proceeds to point out how little power or control a king actu-
ally has. Despite all his wealth and property, he can use only a limited 
number of things and consume a limited number of objects. He is always 
dependent on others, such as his counselors, and his life is circumscribed 
by the demands of others. He can sleep and eat only when permitted and 
often cannot gratify his desires because he has to transact the business of 
the state. She also shows that a king cannot be truly detached from the 
world. He is mistrustful of others, and a prey to fear, grief, alarm, insom-
nia, and unsubstantial happiness. The king shares the attachments and 
problems of all householders. Other men are kings in their own homes 
and suffer similar losses and victories on a smaller scale.
Finally, Sulabha demonstrates that her intellectual union with the king 
is not sinful. She has not touched him physically and it is a misinterpreta-
tion to consider this a sexual union. It was improper for him to proclaim 
before his court that she had entered into union with him. The intellec-
tual communion between them was a private matter and by making it 
public and describing it in sexual terms, he has disrespected himself, her, 
and his courtiers.
Sulabha declares that her body is different from Janaka’s but there is 
no difference between her Self or Spirit (Atman) and his Self or any other 
person’s Self. Janaka confused body and Self/Spirit when he considered 
the union of selves to be a bodily union. A wise person knows that the 
Self has no real connection with his/her own body, let alone the bodies of 
others. Her assessment is that while Janaka is not fully immersed in the 
domestic mode of life, he has not yet attained emancipation. He is midway 
between the two, pretending to be emancipated.
She tells Janaka that she belongs to a royal family and no husband could 
be found fi t for her. She wanders over the earth alone, practicing asceti-
cism. She tells him that she is in fact a Kshatriya, just like him. Once 
again, Janaka has betrayed his prejudiced assumptions by assuming that 
all ascetics are Brahmans or that only a Brahman can be an ascetic. She 
says that she came to meet him only to discuss emancipation with him. 
She points out that nothing she has said is meant to glorify herself or to 
humiliate opponents, since an emancipated person, being tranquil, speaks 
only to express the truth and never to engage in intellectual competition 
or to win a dispute. Bhishma comments that Janaka is unable to answer 
Sulabha’s reasoned words. This indicates that her arguments are unan-
swerable. At the end of this debate, Janaka is silenced by truth, unlike 
Gargi, who in her debate with Yajnavalkya, is silenced by terror tactics.
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Janaka Versus Sulabha: Arrogance Versus Dignity
Most modern discussions of the Mahabharata do not mention Sulabha. 
One scholar, who mentions her in passing, dismisses her as “just a mav-
erick and nothing more” (Shah 1995, 68). While there is no doubt that 
Sulabha, as a learned single woman, is an exception in the Mahabharata, 
nevertheless the recurrent presence of this fi gure in several texts and her 
triumph in this text do show that celibacy and learning were conceived 
of as options for the few women who might manage to defi ne themselves 
as exceptional.
Much more important, however, is the content of the debate, wherein 
Sulabha provides philosophical justifi cation for equality and non-dif-
ferentiation between women and men. Similar statements regarding 
non-differentiation made elsewhere in the Mahabharata, for example, in 
the BhagvadGita (the man of steady wisdom sees no difference between 
a Brahman and an elephant, a cow and a cow-eater), are not transposed 
from perception (what the wise man sees) to social action (how the wise 
man treats these beings, although many stories in the epics do suggest 
that the wise man would treat all beings with respect). Sulabha, however, 
tells Janaka not just that he was wrong to see her and himself as differ-
ent because of gender, but also that he acted wrongly when he followed 
social conventions regarding gender and reproached her for ignoring those 
conventions.
Janaka and his arguments regarding gender are easily recognizable and 
conventional ones. First, he defi nes a woman by her ties to men, and if 
he cannot do so, he becomes very uncomfortable. Hence his anxiety to 
know “whose” Sulabha is. As in the oft-quoted dictum of Manu, Janaka 
believes that a woman always belongs to some man—father, husband, 
or son. If she does not belong to one man, she is then a wicked or loose 
woman who cannot be trusted as she may unite with any man, activated 
by lust, or may act as a spy for a king and deceive other kings.
Second, Janaka doubts that a beautiful young woman is capable of sub-
duing her senses—this misogynist doubt is in consonance with the many 
pronouncements regarding the uncontrollable nature of women’s sexual 
desires found in ancient and medieval texts, both Indian and European. 
Since he defi nes women as sexual, not intellectual or spiritual, beings (he 
claims that a woman’s power consists only in youth, beauty, and marital 
blessedness), it follows that he cannot conceive of any communion or 
union between a woman and a man that is not sexual. Hence his allega-
tion that by entering into inner union with him through Yoga, Sulabha 
has in fact entered into physical union with him. Here, his thinking is 
in consonance with that of the many stories in the epics and Puranas of 
temptresses seducing men who have renounced desire.
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Janaka arrogantly imagines that since he has achieved emancipation, 
but Sulabha as an unmarried young woman is incapable of doing so, her 
only aim could be to destroy him by seducing him. Janaka cannot con-
ceive of even a seductress acting entirely on her own initiative. Indeed, 
the temptresses in the epic and Puranic stories rarely act on their own 
initiative; they are usually sent by the ascetic’s rivals (often the gods) to 
divest a man of his Yoga powers. Hence Janaka suspects that a rival king 
has sent Sulabha to ruin him.
Third, Janaka displays throughout an arrogance that is unbecoming to 
an emancipated or wise person and also to a good king. He shows none of 
the humility of good kings like Rama and Yudhishthira, and makes the 
outrageous claim that he is superior to all ascetics, a type of claim usually 
made by demons such as Bakasura just before their fall. The hostility he 
displays towards Sulabha represents the specifi cally male dimension of 
his arrogance. Even though she is his guest, he insults her, accusing her 
of wickedness and evildoing.
Sulabha’s response is remarkable for its dignity. Her analysis of the 
faults of speech demonstrates (without stating it) that Janaka’s speech is 
faulty because it is impelled by anger, not reason. She also indirectly cri-
tiques his hostility to her when she points out that an emancipated king 
would view the weak and the strong with an equal eye.
Her reasoned response to Janaka’s argument is very important, because 
here the text provides an answer to the popular view that gender alto-
gether defi nes a woman’s role and her dharma. Sulabha’s argument is 
grounded in basic Hindu philosophical premises, with which few ortho-
dox Hindus would disagree, and this is its strength. Her primary argu-
ments may be summarized thus:
 1. The body is gendered but the Atman (universal Self/Spirit) is not gen-
dered.
 2. The body acquires its gender at a certain stage in the womb, and the body 
changes constantly, so even the body is not always gendered in the same 
way, that is, even bodily gender is not a fi xed or static thing.
 3. The Atman is one and the same in all beings, regardless of the body’s 
gender.
 4. The Atman is neither the property of anyone nor under the control of 
anyone, and the Atman does not really act.
Following from these philosophical premises are her important secondary 
arguments that have practical implications for women’s social status:
 1. Since the same Atman animates both women and men, women are capable 
of pursuing the same paths as men.
 2. A truly wise person, who has realized the oneness of the Atman, will not 
try to judge anyone, including any woman, by caste or marital status.
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 3. The Atman is not the property of anyone, so a truly wise person realizes 
that to ask a woman to whom she belongs is meaningless.
 4. Since the Atman is one, intellectual or spiritual communion/union 
between any two persons, including a man and a woman, is not the same 
as physical union, and is not wrong.
Wifely Devotion as Agency
The debate between the married woman and Kaushika in the Mahab-
harata is at the other end of the spectrum but establishes a similar thesis. 
In this story, the ascetic Kaushika goes on his rounds asking for alms, 
and gets annoyed when a devoted housewife keeps him waiting while 
she serves her husband. When he reproaches her despite her apology, she 
replies with dignity, and gives him an extended scholarly lecture wherein 
she demonstrates that a true Brahman is not one who merely knows the 
scriptures but rather one who has overcome anger and “who looketh upon 
all equal unto himself” (Ganguly 1973, II:424). This point is the same as 
Sulabha’s—a truly wise person sees no difference between a man and a 
woman.
She also claims that the path of virtue she follows is that of devotion 
to her husband whom she regards as the highest god. While this may be 
read as a glorifi cation of subservience, it is worth noting the element of 
agency that the woman claims when she says “I practise that virtue which 
consists in serving my husband” (Ganguly 1973, II:424). Unlike Sulabha, 
she follows the conventional path of most women, yet this path has led 
her to acquire greater virtue than the sage.
The housewife dares to tell the great Brahman sage, “I think, O holy 
one, that thou dost not know what virtue in reality is” (II:425). She then 
sends him to a fowler for further instruction. The Brahman realizes that 
her analysis of his failings is accurate and that her reproof will be advanta-
geous to him. The fowler, who belongs to a very low caste and is engaged 
in a profession (killing living creatures) regarded as despicable, turns out 
to be a highly meritorious person “with senses under complete control,” 
who is completely devoted to his parents (II:425). He considers his parents 
to be his highest deities and serves them night and day. The next several 
chapters are occupied with the fowler’s learned discourse, as he teaches 
the Brahman the nature of true virtue and detachment.
The idea that emerges is that an apparently lowly and unimportant way 
of life may also be a site for self-realization. Like Janaka, Kaushika has 
acquired knowledge of the Vedas and other scriptures but has not acquired 
the virtue that comes from right practice. This right practice may be that 
of asceticism as in Sulabha’s case, or that of a layperson’s selfl ess life, as 
in the case of the housewife and the fowler.
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The housewife’s statement of her own practice is suggestive of agency, 
choice, self-conscious practice, and the dignity arising therefrom. This 
practice puts her in a position to critique and reprove a powerful man who 
is a major philosophical fi gure. As compared to Sulabha, the housewife 
is not independent, and, from our point of view today, appears to be in an 
unfortunate position. Yet, the text attempts to cultivate an understanding 
of all social positions—whether that of king, sage or fowler, housewife 
or ascetic, male or female—as ephemeral, and the pursuit of self-realiza-
tion—whether by the path of devotion, action, or asceticism—as perma-
nently valuable.
Hindu Philosophy and Women’s Choices
Sulabha’s victory in the debate (demonstrated by Janaka’s inability to 
answer her) justifi es her own choices in life (not to marry, to wander the 
world alone, to seek emancipation by the same path as men), and her 
actions (to enter into public debate with a famous man, to enter into Yogic 
union with him). Although she is an exception in the Mahabharata, it 
is important to note that she is a recurrent fi gure in several texts widely 
separated by time, and is thus an emblematic fi gure, like Janaka. Her 
choices act as a model and her arguments provide a philosophical justifi ca-
tion, within Hinduism, for any woman to make unconventional choices. 
Her arguments are not restricted to women of any particular caste or class; 
since they are based on the oneness of the universal Atman, they apply to 
any woman anywhere.
Medieval women mystics, like the famous poet and fi fteenth-century 
princess, Mirabai, also a Kshatriya renunciant, thus emerge in the context 
of medieval devotion and also in the context of an older tradition that 
makes space for women. Before the modern period, social conditions pre-
vented women in most societies throughout the world (not just in India) 
from staying single and pursuing intellectual and spiritual paths in an 
autonomous manner; it is important that when exceptional women have 
made such choices in India, they have usually found some acceptance, not 
just on the fringes, but even in the mainstream of society. Hindu philoso-
phy easily lends itself to arguments such as those of Sulabha.
While many Hindu texts, especially law books, and Hindu philosophy 
itself are often used to justify inequality and non-freedom, Hindu texts 
and Hindu philosophical arguments have also frequently been used, both 
in pre-modern and in modern India, to legitimize egalitarianism and free-
dom. For example, in the nineteenth century, Ramabai (1858–1922), a 
young widow educated by her father, demonstrated her knowledge of San-
skrit and began to work to educate women. A conclave of Brahmans gave 
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her the title “Pandita” (feminine version of Pandit, meaning a scholar). 
She retained this title throughout her life, even after her conversion to 
Christianity, and is still known today as Pandita Ramabai Saraswati.
The representation of a female fi gure winning a debate, which is a 
battle of words, arguably works as a more imitable model than the rep-
resentation of a female winning a battle with weapons. Both in texts 
and in life, many more females engage in debate and conversation than 
in warfare. Kali’s or Durga’s miraculous victories in battle may inspire 
women to fi ght for justice or to take revenge on oppressors; Sulabha’s 
logical victory in debate has the potential to make the oppressor see the 
folly of his thinking.
Focusing on Debate
When we focus on the dynamic debates regarding gender that fl ourish 
in ancient Hindu texts we help combat the stereotype of these texts as 
either monolithically justifying the subordination of women or as mono-
lithically honoring women. This endeavor enables us to study how these 
pre-modern textual debates have refl ected and enabled ongoing non-tex-
tual debates as well as many different societal trends and practices in 
Indian societies through the ages. Finally, it also helps us understand that 
modern Indian debates about gender have a history that is not traceable 
to Euro-American feminism alone, a history that defi nes the questions 
and poses the answers both similarly to and differently from the way the 
questions and answers have been posited in Euro-American debates about 
gender.
I would like to thank the anonymous NWSA Journal readers whose 
reports helped me to refi ne my argument and improve this essay.
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Notes
 1. Even Vidyalankar (1984) fails to discuss Sulabha in her study specifi cally 
of the Shanti Parva, the section of the Mahabharata in which the debate 
occurs.
 2. Kishwar (2000) makes a similar point, but takes it much further than I 
am willing to take it. She argues, for example, that Manu, the putative author 
of the Manusmriti (who may well be an amalgam of many authors), would 
have supported Kishwar’s right to compose her own Smriti (sacred remem-
bered text) if “he” lived today.
 3. This is broadly the approach taken by Altekar in his pioneering work, The 
Position of Women in Hindu Civilization (1956) and also by Bader (1925). 
Bhavalkar (1999) belongs to the same school.
 4. For example, the Shanti Parva, in which the Sulabha-Janaka debate occurs, 
also contains about one third of the precepts of the Manusmriti, repeated in 
near-identical form.
 5. Pintchman (1994) argues that Indian women have been unable to draw 
on these goddesses as models. She suggests, though, that Kali could be an 
empowering model (213). McDermott (1996) shows how Kali is the most con-
genial of all Hindu goddesses both to scholars and to feminists in the West. 
In Hawley and Wulff’s anthology, Devi: The Goddesses of India (1996), there 
are essays on consort goddesses like Radha and warrior goddesses like Kali, 
but no essay on Saraswati. Kinsley (1986) is an exception, as he studies each 
individual goddess, including Saraswati, in some detail. Interestingly, major 
mainstream Indian publishing houses have chosen the names of the goddess 
of learning, Saraswati and Sharada, as names for their enterprises, while the 
Indian feminist publishing house is called Kali.
 6. A point made in different ways by many Western philosophers as well, 
from Heraclitus to Montaigne and David Hume, and most recently by post-
modernists.
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